



## The Frontispiece of Leviathan – Hobbes' Bible Use

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This article analyses the frontispiece of Thomas Hobbes' *Leviathan* with a focus on the relation between theology and politics as it is illustrated on the cover of this *grand œuvre*, and in particular on the figure of Leviathan himself. The scope of the article is to discuss the form of power and authority symbolised on the frontispiece, and it is thus not an image analyses in the traditional sense. Rather, it is to discuss the kind of political theory the frontispiece represents. Not only is Hobbes' decision to put forward a theory of a commonwealth that is both civil as well as ecclesiastical only a few years after the great religious Thirty Years' War a bold one: *Leviathan* represents a new way of conceiving the relation between sovereign and citizen as it combines Christian political theory and aesthetics. Having its methodological point of departure especially in Giorgio Agamben, the article will develop the argument that Leviathan, in this regard, represents a political version of the Christian angelology. Leviathan becomes the "divine messenger" par excellence, who functions as temporal minister and administrator of God's will and government. The central questions of the article therefore are: how and why does Hobbes' Leviathan achieve his authority and power through theological ideas on power, and how decisive is the Bible in this regard? In other words, how is Hobbes' Bible use political?

**KEYWORDS:** Hobbes; Agamben; political philosophy; Old Testament; authority; Bible use

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*Auctoritas non veritas facit legem*

HOBBS, *Leviathan*

Few modern classics have achieved such fame as Thomas Hobbes' *Leviathan* (1651). However, few scholars and researchers have taken the time to reflect on the name and title of the book which are in many ways unusual. Even less focus has been afforded to the frontispiece of the book<sup>1</sup>. This is somewhat more surprising since in *Leviathan*, Hobbes repeatedly refers to or, at least, presupposes

an awareness of this fundamental construction of his commonwealth as pictured here: the glorious king containing the citizens in his belly. Neither has the fact that Hobbes' king on the frontispiece is pictured under a citation from Job's Book in the Bible reached any point of analysis. What is the meaning of such a frontispiece, such a title, and such a citation? These are questions this article seeks to answer.

In the contractual tradition known as the social contract, and in which we find Hobbes, it appears that the contract argued in *Leviathan* between state and citizen is a very peculiar one and that it, in one way or the other, needs the Bible in this referential strategy. The tradition of the social contract, which was to become of substantial importance to the developments of the Western states in European Modernity, is a major factor in the formation process of the form of government later to be known as the democratic one. This is an interesting

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connection since democracy is a generally secular form of government.

The purpose of the article is not to conduct a simple image analysis. Instead, its methodology follows Michel Foucault's *Surveiller et punir*, where it was shown that Bentham's drawing of the Panopticon contained his thoughts on the prison *in nuce*. Something very similar can be said about Hobbes' illustration on *Leviathan*. Also Hobbes' Leviathan on the frontispiece is the aesthetical-architectonic machine of "a conscious and permanent state of visibility assuring the automatic function of power" and where the subjects, like Bentham's delinquents in his Panopticon, are "taken in a situation of power of which they themselves are the carrier"<sup>2</sup>.

The course of the article is as follows: in section 1, a short explanation of citation use is presented, in sections 2-3 the occurrence and context of Leviathan in the Bible is examined which in section 4 is followed by an analysis of the Job-citation itself on Hobbes' book *Leviathan*. Having these sections as their outset, the last two sections, 5-7, address the aesthetics on *Leviathan's* frontispiece and how this plays a central role in Hobbes' political philosophy.

## 1. Citation and Authority

The Job-citation on *Leviathan's* frontispiece is paradigmatic for Hobbes' strategy in the book. By using the Bible in a general methodology of citation – witnessed not only on the frontispiece but in *Leviathan* as a whole, full of Biblical references – Hobbes returns, in fact, to a praxis developed most profoundly in the philosophical tradition known as scholasticism.

Bonaventure gives four methods one can use when writing a book:

Ad intelligentiam dictorum notandum, quod quadruplex est modus faciendi librum. Aliquis enim scribit aliena, nihil addendo vel mutando; et iste mere dicitur *scriptor*. Aliquis scribit aliena, addendo, sed non de suo; et iste *compilator* dicitur. Aliquis scribit et aliena et sua, sed aliena tanquam principalia, et sua tanquam annexa ad evidentiam; et iste dicitur *commentator*, non auctor. Aliquis scribit et sua et aliena, sed sua tanquam principalia, aliena tanquam annexa ad confirmationem; et talis debet dici *auctor*.<sup>5</sup>

If we focus on the Leviathanian frontispiece, it becomes clear that Hobbes follows the *auctor*-strategy in this regard. *Leviathan* is not a commentary (*commentator*) to the Job-citation – or

to any other citation from the Bible appearing numerous times throughout the book. Instead, the Bible is an annex (*annexa*), a supplement to Hobbes' own and proper writing (*sed sua tanquam principalia*). Since the citation from Job appears on the frontispiece, it does not seem far-fetched to interpret the artwork on the frontispiece itself as an *annexa* to Hobbes' writing. Perhaps it could even be said, although metaphorically, that in the same way the Job-citation is used as a poetical confirmation (*confirmationem*) of *Leviathan*, the frontispiece's artwork is an aesthetical one.

One could, perhaps, suspect that the use of citations merely has the purpose of establishing an authority behind one's own text. And to some extent this is also true, especially when it comes to *Leviathan's* citations from the Bible – on the frontispiece in particular. However, in the Latin and medieval poetical tradition in which Hobbes' authorship is founded, it is important to remember that the philosophical ground upon which the idea of the citation stands; its function is more complex than to simply act as a guarantee for the author's statements. Rather, the citation relies on the juridical idea of *auctoritas* (authority) in which an affinity with *auctor* can easily be acknowledged (and recognised in a wide range of European languages: author (Eng.), *autore* (Ita.), *auteur* (Fr.), *autor* (Esp.)). The original conception, hence, is not to prove a proposition *post festum* by way of the citation. In the same sense that an *auctoritas* cannot be established after the juridical event in question but needs to be so before. It is the other way around. The citation, Baroncini writes, must prove what is new. It is *ante festum*<sup>4</sup>. The citation, like *auctoritas*, has ontological significance. In treating Dante's *Convivio*, Baroncini writes that Dante accentuates the nuances in the two terms, *auctor* and *auctoritas*, author and authority, only to:

– bring back "author" to the double derivation of "auieo", i.e. "tie together ("ligare"), which is said of the poets who "bring words together" and secondly, in general, of "autentin" from the Greek *authéntes* "who acts by himself, who has power, absolute authority."<sup>5</sup>

Nothing could state this duplicity of *auctor* and *auctoritas* clearer than to have the citation from Job on *Leviathan's* frontispiece and thus in the most literal sense "before" the book. As a citation, in *terminus technicus*, it announces something new authorised by the Bible, letting Hobbes be the author par excellence who may "act by himself"

although on the Bible's behalf and become, himself, authority.

## 2. Leviathan in Psalms and Isaiah

Jean Bernhardt has shown that Hobbes was intrigued by optics, iconography and other visual themes when he was formulating his political theory<sup>6</sup>. It is therefore not surprising that the outcome of such an interest can be seen on the artistically made frontispiece of *Leviathan* – as it could on *De cive*, published nine years earlier. However, even before the reading starts, the reader commencing the Hobbesian *grand œuvre* is met by a very different Leviathan on the frontispiece than the monster we have read of in the Bible – one of the few sources mentioning Leviathan<sup>7</sup>. In the Bible, Leviathan is nothing like a king with crown, sword, and crook. He is an animal. In fact, ever since the publication of the King James Bible in 1611, readers of English were used to seeing animals associated with the Bible<sup>8</sup>.

In the Vulgate, the Latin translation of the Bible, Leviathan as a proper noun appears six times all of which are in The Old Testament: once in Psalms, twice in Isaiah and, most importantly, at the beginning and at the end of Job.

Psalms based on the Hebrew tongue, that is on the Jewish Bible, reads:

tu confregisti capita Leviathan  
dedisti eum in escam populo Aethio-  
pum. (*Ps* (Vulg.) 73,14)<sup>9</sup>

To complicate matters, the Vulgate version of Psalms 73,14 based solely on the Greek text has *draconis* instead of Leviathan. In Isaiah 27,1 the second mention of Leviathan the text reads:

in die illo visitabit Dominus in gla-  
dio suo duro et grandi et forti  
super Leviathan serpentem vectem  
et super Leviathan serpentem tor-  
tuosum [...] (*Is* (Vulg.) 27,1)<sup>10</sup>

Amongst commentators in the Middle Ages there seem to be some disagreement about the interpretation of Leviathan. Is it a snake, a giant fish, or a dragon? This conflict is also reflected in the exegesis of the Vulgate version of The Old Testament. As quoted in Psalms, only the Vulgate version based upon the Hebrew text renders the passage in question with the proper noun 'Leviathan'; the one based on the Greek tongue, on the Septuagint, writes *draconis*<sup>11</sup>. Needless to say, the Christian Middle Age commentators had a special interest in the delicate zoological problem due to the

mythology tied to the snake in the Garden of Eden. Since the Septuagint was written by Greek speaking diaspora Jews, amongst whom it came into general use "even in the synagogue," as Alexander Grieve wrote in the 1911 edition of the *Encyclopædia Britannica*, it is thus far from a Christian context<sup>12</sup>. The Septuagint did not have such a frame of understanding and therefore neither such a problem. In the Septuagint, δράκων contains both meanings – snake as well as dragon. However, Leviathan as proper noun is mentioned nowhere in the Greek Septuagint. In the Hebrew Bible, Leviathan is used sometimes, other times Behemot or a descriptive sentence has been preferred like in the Septuagint<sup>13</sup>. For instance, where the Vulgate writes 'Leviathan', the Septuagint writes δράκων<sup>14</sup> or other times, "τὴν ἄγιαν καὶ τὴν μάχαιραν" (*Is* (LXX) 27,1) like in the Isaiah citation above<sup>15</sup>.

Of course, all these creatures – snake, giant fish, dragon – share the connotations by which Leviathan in the Vulgate is described: it is a beastly, violent and furious animal. In the Vulgate, Leviathan is the name for the incarnation and personification of violence and anger, and to such a degree that perhaps only God himself can chasten this creature. However, whatever this creature really is, it is not personified until the Vulgate version of the Bible by Latin speaking Christian Romans. Leviathan is therefore to a large degree a Roman construct.

## 3. Obedience and Job

The most important mention of Leviathan in the Vulgate is of course in Job. Here we find a more detailed account of Leviathan than in other parts of the Vulgate, and it is from here that the citation on *Leviathan's* frontispiece is taken.

In Job, God has made a bet with Satan. Satan believes Job only fears God because God is responsible for Job's wealth and well being. God, on the other hand, believes Job fears him because he is a faithful believer. Satan, however, is not convinced. He propositions God to make a bet: Job will curse God sooner or later. God accepts the challenge. Satan may now see for himself that Job truly is a strong keeper of the Law, that he will not turn against his God. Consequently, Job's fate is in the hands of Satan, who tests Job in the most extreme ways. Everything Job owns is taken from him including his family, and he is tormented by all kinds of sufferings and sicknesses. In the end, though perhaps unsurprising, God wins the bet. No matter how extreme Satan's trials of poor Job are, he does not curse God but keeps the (Mosaic) Law intact. Following the common logic in The Old Testament, Job is subsequently given back all his

possessions – and, to salve the wound, his possessions are even multiplied. Even his daughters are more beautiful than those he lost:

non sunt autem inventae mulieres  
speciosae sicut filiae Iob in univer-  
sa terra” (*Iob* (Vulg.) 42,15)<sup>16</sup>

As a biblical text, Job’s particular poetic style bears most resemblance to the style of Psalms. The two books are the Old Testament’s longest, appearing one after the other. Most importantly, the Book of Job represents one of the clearest differences in comparison with the traditional Christian world, where God and Satan are interpreted as diametrical oppositions of good and evil. In Job absolute differences or, rather, the absolute as such, seems to be weakened – if existing at all. God and Job almost share the same challenging question: is Law eternal and absolute? More than man’s protest against God’s apparently meaningless tests, the theme in Job is double: it seems as though man can influence the divine order, since God at least relies on Job continuously accepting Satan’s challenges and performing accordingly, and at the same time Job’s story is most of all a story about divine or sovereign violence<sup>17</sup>. Also of interest to us is the theme of death in Job’s trials: a few have to die in order to maintain the eternal divine order. There seem to be two consequences: firstly, if society has suffered a loss – the death of a citizen (Job’s daughters) – it is most of all for the greater good (the belief in God and in His Law, in sovereign power); secondly, such a loss will result in a society that is even better than the former one. It is not by coincidence that the new and more beautiful daughters are provided by the same sovereign power that let them die in the first place<sup>18</sup>.

In Western Europe and its Christian world, Job has traditionally been read as the theodicy problem’s *locus classicus*<sup>19</sup>. However, thinking on Hobbes’ Bible use – and of the Old Testament world in general – the question is if Job is not really a myth about something completely different: obedience, to keep following the command, the divine Law established by God no matter what. Setting aside the Christian theological tradition in which it was later captured, Job is more about how far obedience can be stretched than it is a text about good and evil. The conversations God and Satan have in Job’s first two chapters concern to a lesser degree good versus evil and to a higher degree God’s conviction that there really is no end to how much Job will accept in order to keep His Law intact and do as he is told. God’s belief that Job’s obedience is absolute is so strong that he lets Satan himself test Job: “et dixit Dominus ad Satan numquid considerasti servum meum Iob

quod non sit ei similis in terra vir simplex et rectus” (*Iob* (Vulg.) 2,5)<sup>20</sup>. Job becomes the symbol of total acceptance in fulfilling the Law. If this is true, Job is able to fulfil what Adam in the Garden of Eden was not: complete obedience<sup>21</sup>. Thus, Job has Genesis and the creation of the world as its internal, Biblical reference. *En passant*, one could mention that Job’s Biblical model has a modern political equivalent in Adolph Eichmann who blindly followed the sovereign’s, Hitler’s words; as Eichmann himself states in the aphorism “Führerworte haben Gesetzeskraft”<sup>22</sup>.

It is precisely the reference concerning obedience that interests Hobbes in the myth of Job: obedience by man to the sovereign and creation of the world (or commonwealth in Hobbes’ terminology). It is clear that any obedience, if broken, in the Biblical sphere has severe consequences just as it had for Adam. Hobbes himself states the need of such a sovereign violence very clearly. In fact, violence is so essential that it becomes the very foundation of Hobbes’ commonwealth:

And this is the foundation of that right of punishing, which is exercised in every commonwealth. For the subjects did not give the sovereign that right; but only in laying down theirs, strengthened him to use his own, as he should think fit, for the preservation of them all: so that it was not given, but left to him, and to him only; and (excepting the limits set him by natural law) as entire, as in the condition of mere nature, and of war of every one against his neighbour.<sup>23</sup>

When Hobbes identifies the condition of mere nature and law his real intention, which we read at the end, is to identify violence (nature) and justice (law) in the person of the sovereign. Leviathan becomes the justification of the violence of the strongest, the sovereign, in the same way that God’s violence was just when he threw out Adam and Eve. Indeed, Hobbes’s Leviathan does seem to be the personification of such a justification as he stands there on the frontispiece tall and powerful with crown, sword and crook as if incarnating both the *ius divinum* as well as the *ius humanum*.

#### 4. “*Non est potestas Super Terram quae Comparetur ei*”

In the philosophical tradition the justification of sovereign violence belongs to what one could call the principle of the *nómos basileus*.

In his examination of this syntagm Giorgio Agamben has argued in favour of the point of view that Hobbes owes a great deal of his thoughts on Leviathan to the Greek poet Pindar and his fragment 169. Agamben translates the fragment in the following way: “The *nomos*, sovereign of all, of mortals and immortals, leads with the strongest hand, justifying the most violent. I judge this from the works of Hercules”<sup>24</sup>. Agamben believes it to be one of the first documents in the West identifying violence and law, and from which also the Sophists build their state theory:

“If, for the Sophists, the anteriority of *physis* ultimately justifies the violence of the strongest, to Hobbes it is this very identity of the state of nature and violence [...] that justifies the absolute power of the sovereign. In both cases, even if apparently oppositional, the *physis* / *nomos* [nature / law] antinomy constitutes the presupposition that legitimates the principle of sovereignty, the indistinction of law and violence (in the Sophists’ strong man or the Hobbesian sovereign). In fact, it is important to note that in Hobbes, the state of nature survives in the person of the sovereign who is the only one to preserve its natural *ius contra omnes*.”<sup>25</sup>

Even though Agamben convincingly traces Hobbes’ line of thought back to Pindar and the Sophists concerning the intimacy between justice (δικη) and violence (βία), it remains a fact that in *Leviathan*, Hobbes is less interested in such a “pagan” heritage and more focused on maintaining a Christian perspective. Or at the very least Hobbes ties together Pindar’s and the Sophists’ considerations with those of the Christian tradition. If such an interpretation is correct, the Sophists’ strong man becomes, in Hobbes, the Christian *rex* Leviathan. This is likely to be yet another reason for the citation from Job on the frontispiece. As Hobbes’ intention is to combine civil and ecclesiastical, like *Leviathan’s* subtitle reads, it addresses more the Christian political theological theme of sovereign obedience in Job, than Hobbes’ relation to classical (Greek) philosophy. Hobbes, furthermore, seems to have nothing but contempt for this tradition, proven beyond doubt by the following passage:

Lastly, the metaphysics, ethics and politics of Aristotle, the frivolous distinctions, barbarous terms, and obscure language of the Schoolmen, taught in the universities, which have been all erected and regulated by the Pope’s authority, serve them to keep these errors from being

detected, and to make men mistake the *ignis fatuus* of vain philosophy, for the light of the Gospel.<sup>26</sup>

With this in mind, a closer look at Leviathan’s two appearances in Job shows how a Christian king is constructed. In Job, Leviathan is mentioned briefly at the beginning of the book:

maledicant ei qui maledicunt diei qui parati sunt suscitare Leviathan (*Job* (Vulg.) 3,8)<sup>27</sup>

At the end of the book, Leviathan is described in detail over an entire chapter. Leviathan has a double-string vest, we are told; its back is covered with shields; it spews fire like a dragon; its belly is filled with meat. Considering that the plot rests on a bet on obedience between God and Satan, it is interesting to notice that Leviathan is described the following way:

ipse principium est *viarum Dei* qui fecit eum adplicabit gladium eius (*Job* (Vulg.) 40,14, italics mine)<sup>28</sup>

The difference between the Septuagint and the Vulgate is here important. The Vulgate’s idea of a *viarum Dei* (a divine road) does to a lesser degree translate the Septuagint original θηρίον, and interprets it to a greater degree (*Job* (LXX) 40,15). This θηρίον, which is later to be personified as Leviathan in the Vulgate, is in the Septuagint’s next chapter mentioned as God’s angel: “τῶν ἀγγέλων μου” (*Job* (LXX) 41,25). What originally was God’s monster or demon, a fallen angel (θηρίον), is in the Roman tradition of the Vulgate an instrument, the way (*via*) by which God executes his will on earth. And, in fact, the text does nothing to hide the violent aspect of such an execution: through Leviathan, the citation above reads, God may now apply his sword (*adplicabit gladium eius*). Leviathan has become the “divine messenger” through whom God performs his actions in the world which takes the form of violence. Leviathan is “*rex super universos filios superbiae*” (*Job* (Vulg.) 41,25)<sup>29</sup>. Leviathan, in a Carl Schmitt-like formulation, is “Hüter der civitas”. He, and no one else, is the guarantee man must obey.

Hobbes’ use of this Biblical poetic framework to formulate his political theory does, in fact, preempt up to Carl Schmitt; it points to his most famous aphorism: “All significant concepts of modern political science are secularised theological ones”<sup>30</sup>. Like Hobbes himself often states, Leviathan is “that *mortal god*, to which we owe under the *Immortal God*, our peace and defence”<sup>31</sup>. This is the

background upon which we must understand the Jobian citation we find on *Leviathan's* frontispiece:

non est super terram potestas quae  
comparatur ei [...] (*Iob* (Vulg.) 41,24)<sup>52</sup>

In this passage, the Septuagint seems to agree on this and although it speaks of a mythological creature it nonetheless describes it as a βασιλεύς, a king. Leviathan is a secularised angel in the shape of a king who, just like the angels, rules under “the eternal law of God”<sup>53</sup>. Just as the angels travel between the profane and the divine world, so, too, does the Leviathan embrace both: the ecclesiastical as well as the civil holding crook and sword. Leviathan truly is the *nómos basileus*. Like God, he uses his creations, the angels, so he does not have to constantly interfere with the world and to perform miracles endlessly. Thus, in a parallel way, Hobbes’ God has his creation, Leviathan, the *via* and the “method” by which He may execute his will.

## 5. Clothes and Power

Abraham Bosse is the artist who made the frontispiece of Hobbes’s *Leviathan* in close cooperation with the author himself<sup>54</sup>. This, of course, was not the first time the mythological creature of Leviathan had been illustrated.

The myth has inspired many artists all the way up to Modernity. One of the most beautiful is Gustave Doré’s copper engraving *Destruction du Léviathan* from 1865<sup>55</sup>. This engraving presents us with the Biblical myth to the letter: Leviathan is a strange mixture half dragon, half sea monster. Only God can save the small village one sees vaguely in the back of the engraving, captured by Leviathan’s tail and lower body. However, Hobbes’s Leviathan on Bosse’s artwork is neither dragon nor monster. The exegetic problem in Psalms and Isaiah concerning Leviathan’s zoology is not in view on *Leviathan's* frontispiece. Yet, Hobbes’ Leviathan is no less a mythological creature. Although king he is nonetheless an artificial man and a work of art: “For by art is created that great LEVIATHAN called a COMMONWEALTH, or STATE, in Latin CIVITAS, which is but an artificial man ; [...]”<sup>56</sup>. This is one of the first sentences in *Leviathan*. In our view it is also one of the most striking ones, because its meaning is symbolised on the frontispiece: Leviathan’s body consists of people and his uniform is also made out of people. This is the art of Leviathan. Leviathan is both made out of human beings and dressed in human beings. His body and clothes are his own and, yet, at the same time they are also those of someone else: the citizens. Clothes and body therefore form a

strange relationship on the frontispiece. Neither clothes nor body, neither Leviathan nor citizen, can be told apart. They are, most of all, something like a puzzle picture, a Möbius band: viewed one way the clothes belong to the citizens, viewed another way they belong to Leviathan forming his string vest. In other words, viewed one way we see a mass of citizens contained in the belly of Leviathan; viewed another way we see Leviathan’s clothes. The king Leviathan and the citizens of his kingdom are one and the same; they cannot be told apart and the metaphor staging this is clothes.

At the beginning of the 1960s, Ernst H. Kantorowicz gave a speech which was later published as *Gods in uniform*. In the article Kantorowicz thanked Andreas Alföldi, since the problem he touched on went back to a discussion on the political and theological importance of clothes, signs and other symbols and ornaments of power on which Alföldi had been working in the period 1934-1935 during his research on the Roman Empire<sup>57</sup>. We know that the difference between civil clothes and the military uniform was important to the Romans. No citizen was allowed to enter the city if not in civil clothes with the exception of the head of state. For instance, in Cicero’s *Philippicae*, it is clear that the Romans must redress themselves when going to war, and that the only time a Roman was allowed to wear a war uniform in peace time in the city itself was in case of a *iustitium*, “the archetype of the modern *Ausnahmezustand* [state of exception]”, Agamben explains<sup>58</sup>. “I declare that it is necessary”, Cicero addresses the senate in his *Philippicae*, “to declare a state of public disorder (*tumultus*), to proclaim a state of exception (*iustitium*) and to dress ourselves to fight (*sagsumi*)”<sup>59</sup>. Alföldi himself saw his research as the missing link in Theodor Mommsen’s enormous work on the Roman Empire, the five volume *Römisches Staatsrecht* published 1871-1888 and Kantorowicz, on his part, may be said to be the missing link in tying these insights together with Christianity, something neither Mommsen nor Alföldi did<sup>40</sup>. In both Greece and Rome, Kantorowicz argued, it was a common practice to picture the Gods in armour, a tendency that seems to continue in the Christian era:

Christ was repeatedly represented with the imperial purple chlamys around his shoulders, as, for example, in the ceiling-painting of the Roman tomb of Clodius Hermes, ca. a.d. 250 – that is, at a time when also the expression *Christus Imperator* had become relatively common.<sup>41</sup>

If we look at *Leviathan's* frontispiece with Kantorowicz' analysis in *Gods in Uniforms* in mind, it does seem rather clear that Hobbes seeks a sort of *imitatio imperatorum* on the part of Leviathan as king and that he, at the same time, seeks a kind of *imitatio deorum* on the part of Leviathan as a (mortal) God. When Leviathan is dressed like a king in clothes that on the frontispiece are shown to be made out of men and, furthermore, because he wears the highest royal ornament, the crown, Leviathan is king and mortal God. Leviathan's human clothes – in the most literal sense – are transformed into juridical clothes giving him the potentiality of executing just violence. *Imitatio deorum* and *imitatio imperatorum* are united and, one could even say, secularised in Leviathan, because the divine law is now dressed in profanity: the human being itself. Without this unity of temporal and spiritual, of man and God, “men see double, and mistake their *lawful sovereign*”, Hobbes explains<sup>42</sup>. It is this power to, in the end, take the life of the citizen if he should so think fit which equips Leviathan's actions with the force-of-law or, in other terms, the applicability of “the eternal law of God” upon the world<sup>45</sup>.

It is therefore interesting to reflect further on one of the most striking terms Kantorowicz introduces in his article on divine imperial clothes: *Christus Imperator*. According to Kantorowicz, as indicated above, there seems to be a secret meeting between the term *Christus Imperator* and clothes, between power and its visualisation. And the Kantorowicz citation above is, in fact, marked with a footnote referring to the German theologian Erik Peterson's *Christus als Imperator* from 1936. Also in this text Alföldi played a central role, as Peterson referred repeatedly to Alföldi's work on the Roman Empire in general. Since Hobbes defines Leviathan in terms akin to those that traditionally define Christ, that is as the Mortal God, it seems appropriate to look closer on Peterson's idea on Christ as *imperator*. Furthermore, Hobbes is most likely to have already realised what Peterson later was to note, namely that the Christian patriarchs were eager to associate Christ with either a *rex*, a *princeps* or with an *imperator*<sup>44</sup>. Peterson followed his idea throughout the early Christian literature, which lead him to conclude the following:

If one reflects on all these connections, it would also be permitted to understand the places where the ancient Christian literature mentions Christ as an *imperator* not only as Christ's land lord in his *militia* but, rather, also to see the Christus-Imperator as the lord of an

*imperium*, which transcends all the *imperia* of this world<sup>45</sup>

The term *Christus-Imperator* signifies a state of power in which the difference between heavenly and earthly government has been diminished and where men do not, to use a Hobbesian formulation, see double. Throughout his short text, Peterson therefore emphasises the relations between the emperor's cult of ancient Rome and the wish amongst the early Christians and patriarchs to develop Christ as an *imperator* by way of letting clothes as well as other ornaments of power constitute such an annulment of the two governments, one earthly and another one heavenly. Peterson seems to suggest a withdrawal of power's ontology (the real physical ruler) for the benefit of what one could call power's visuality (the pomp and circumstance related to the ruler).

The idea, on *Leviathan's* frontispiece, to let the citizens of the commonwealth constitute Leviathan's physiology and to bow towards the king's face as in prayer suggests such a visuality or, in better terms, a political liturgy. Of course, the “head of government” carrying the crown is, literally, not composed of anything else than the king's own face just like his hands holding sword and crook are nothing but his own. Just as face and hand do not require clothing so too is it only the Leviathanian *corps politique* that is dressed in humanity.

## 6. Leviathan's Divine City

One of the greatest differences between Hobbes's frontispiece, the biblical myth and also Doré's copper engraving of Leviathan, is that God is absent on the former. On *Leviathan's* frontispiece, Leviathan himself is the protector, redeemer and saviour of the *civitas*. On earth, if we are to believe the frontispiece, there is no need of God.

What strikes one as particularly odd though is the total absence of citizens on the frontispiece. The city is evacuated. No one is in sight. The only citizens are those forming Leviathan's body. The city itself, however, is carefully drawn with contours, shadows, balances and with a wealth of detail not found outside the city. It seems quite obvious that Hobbes in his collaboration with Bosse wishes to mark a clear distinction between city and land, culture and nature. Nonetheless, Leviathan stands tall in the horizon like a sun refusing to set, seemingly both belonging and not belonging to the city, both inside and outside its juridical-political order just like Schmitt teaches us is the paradoxical definition of the sovereign<sup>46</sup>. The city itself is constructed according to the Roman architectural

idea of a grating, which the empire took over from the Babylonians and the Egyptians. In its most simple form, it consists of a single grating, a cross, having two main roads crossing each other. Also the Roman *castrum* (military camp) followed this idea, and was divided in such four squares by way of two crossing axes (*decumanus* and *cardo*), which was considered a universal architectonic principle. The Roman was therefore at home, wherever he was<sup>47</sup>.

In the theological context in which Hobbes has chosen to place his *Leviathan*, one must not forget that Leviathan with his arms forms a cross, both referring to the Christian idea of salvation and to the cohesion profane-divine, man-God, earth-heaven. This principle, of course, is also symbolised by the body of Christ who hung upon the cross, and is a structure reflective in church architecture. As we read in Paul's first letter to the Corinthians, the body of Christ is the church and its members; this corresponds perfectly with the Leviathanian body consisting of men, thereby constituting the Hobbesian *ekklesia*, furthermore symbolised by the Leviathanian citizens facing the king's head in prayer<sup>48</sup>. It should come as no surprise, therefore, that the most significant building on the frontispiece is the cathedral. It is also upon this building that Leviathan's shadow falls<sup>49</sup>.

The term 'cathedral' derives from the late Middle Ages and signifies, in addition to the building, the economic dimension and the organisational structure of the Christian community. Neither church nor cathedral has in the Middle Ages any specific, clear or isolated divine function. Rather, it blends profane and divine aspects from all spectres of human life being both a political as well as an economical and religious centre<sup>50</sup>. Like Francesco Calasso writes in his *Medioevo del diritto*, the ecclesiastical institution itself is an order going beyond the isolated religious sphere and that of canonic or divine law. The ecclesiastical institution establishes an order also manifested in the profane and political sphere: "The Church is in fact a *corpus*, meaning an order [ordinamento]: and the norms it presents already contains all the elements of the juridical herein [...]"<sup>51</sup>. One of these political aspects touched on by the church's extensive function and role is that it is regarded as a *hôtel-Dieu*, especially true for the largest churches, the cathedrals. They are something like a combined hospital and a social service, caring for people in all kinds of need. The area just around the cathedral is reserved for the crippled, sick and poor who here may hope to be taken care of by the cathedral personnel. Also abandoned infants are laid here. The cathedral is a sort of no-man's land or a band of emptiness. However, a pure physical, practical or profane

function is prohibited. The needy man suffers here to enter into another sphere. Hence, the protection, cure and nursing offered here is, the first time round, sacred and only on the second pass profane. Or, rather, whatever enters this zone is transformed into something ecclesiastical. In opposition to the castle – which on *Leviathan's* frontispiece is the profane image on the left corresponding to the sacred church on the right – God's house is entangled in a web of magic. The church protects with more than rocks. The Hobbesian state is in need of both profane and sacred, civil and ecclesiastical in securing law and order. In *Leviathan*, this is stated most clearly: "And that Governor must be one"<sup>52</sup>, Hobbes writes using one of his beloved metaphors as argument:

[...] or else, there must needs follow faction, and civil war in the commonwealth, between the *Church* and *State*; between *spiritualists*, and *temporalists*; between the *sword of justice*, and the *shield of faith*: and, which is more, in every Christian man's own breast, between the *Christian*, and the *man*.<sup>53</sup>

Like the angels were entrusted to conduct and administer the divine government of world and salvation, so, too, Hobbes's Leviathan delivers the *euangelion* that he is the keeper and guarantor for the "*Salus Populi*" which is but the health of the state by whatever means.

## 7. Sword, Crook and Crown

By reference to Kantorowicz' and Peterson's aesthetics, it is clear that Leviathan's sword, crook and crown appear as artifacts or ornaments of power. It is also the analysis of these that, in the end, will allow us to answer the question of why there is not a single citizen in the frontispiece's city.

Hobbes writes that "the two arms of a commonwealth, are *force and justice; the first whereof is in the king; the other deposited in the hands of the parliament*"<sup>54</sup>, which leads one to his iconography. One could of course argue that the two arms are the legislative and executive powers where one holds the sword and another the crook. However, in reflecting further on the ornaments held by these arms, the analysis cannot be made in such a straightforward manner. In the warlike metaphor by which Hobbes presents Leviathan on his frontispiece, it seems more adequate to propose that Leviathan's arms are, rather, God's extended arms representing a twofold structure of power. One that gives and another one that takes life: the sword that takes life and the crook that gives it,

punishment and redemption, state and church. As Hobbes writes: “THE maintenance of civil society depending on justice, and justice on the power of life and death [...]”<sup>55</sup>. However, they seem practically or administratively divided; the sword as the king’s instrument and the crook as the bishop’s, they are, nonetheless, formally united by Leviathan’s sovereign power holding both. This is further underlined by the crown, finding itself on the indistinguishable threshold between the profane and the divine world. On the frontispiece it is clear that the crown is the highest symbol of government, authority and legitimacy, and the “argument” is iconographical.

Let us try to examine even further this power over life and death – which, furthermore, seems to be derived from the metaphor of the state of nature – and read the central citation once again:

For the subjects *did not give* the sovereign that right; but only in *laying down theirs*, strengthened him to use his own, as *he* should think fit, for the *preservation of them all*: so that it was not given, but left to him, and to him only; and (*excepting the limits set him by natural law*) as entire, as in *the condition of mere nature*, and of war of every one against his neighbour.<sup>56</sup>

The character of Leviathan’s protection and preservation is, in Hobbes, above all a violence so brutal and cruel that it is “before” the foundation of the world, as in the state of nature and of war of everyone against everyone. Of course Hobbes is well aware that “there had never been any time, wherein particular men were in a condition of war, one against another”, an assurance given quite early in *Leviathan*<sup>57</sup>. However, the metaphor is nonetheless fully logical, and has nothing to do with history. Hobbes has already stated on the previous page that “the nature of war, consisteth not in actual fighting ; but in the known *disposition* thereto [...]”<sup>58</sup>. The state of nature is a disposition to violence resting in the sovereign Leviathanian body internal in the civil state, the only real existing state. The state of nature is the condition that will appear whenever Leviathan sees the need to do whatever necessary “for the preservation of them all”<sup>59</sup>, as Hobbes wrote. This is also why the juridical limit restraining Leviathan by natural law is but apparent:

THE RIGHT OF NATURE, which writers commonly call *jus naturale*, is the liberty each man hath, to use his power, as he will himself, for the preservation of his own nature; that is to say, of his own life; and consequently, of doing any

thing, which in his own judgement, and reason, he shall conceive to be the aptest means thereunto.<sup>60</sup>

Of course one man (citizen) cannot transfer or give such a violence to another man (Leviathan) since this would mean giving up his liberty and render the *jus natural* meaningless. It is possible, however, to omit to use this violence and therefore strengthen Leviathan, as we read above, “to use his own, as he should think fit”<sup>61</sup>. Although Leviathan is a commonwealth literally consisting of citizens, when Leviathan needs to protect his commonwealth Leviathan, like any other man, uses his own power “for the preservation of his own nature”<sup>62</sup>. The state of nature is a metaphor for the purest violence emerging inside the walls of the commonwealth when it is necessary to protect the very survival of the state, rather than the citizens. This is the reason why the state of nature is the prototype for the state of exception<sup>63</sup>. Since the violence in the state of nature which men laid down is what constitutes and defines the Leviathanian government as such, like we read in the citation above, the state of exception becomes the paradigm for government in *Leviathan*. Not only does Leviathan have a right as that of thousands of men having laid down theirs, he also has the sum of violence as of thousands of men equaling that “of war of every one against his neighbour”<sup>64</sup>. The state of exception is precisely such a vacuum in Law as such permitting a just violence though neither legal nor illegal. Most importantly, like we quoted above, Leviathan’s violence, his disposition to war, is not actual but potential<sup>65</sup>. Like in Foucault’s Panopticon, this kind of power consists of a violence whose real force is potential, not actual. It is non-applied but always in vigour.

It is as if law contained an essential fracture placing itself between the position of the norm and its application and which, in extreme cases, can only be filled through the state of exception by creating a zone in which application is suspended but law remains, as such, in vigour.<sup>66</sup>

The state is guaranteed survival to such an extent that it survives even at the expense of each and every life of the citizens<sup>67</sup>. The consequence, however, is that the only life existing in the commonwealth is political life immediately associated and identical with sovereign power just like we see on the frontispiece.

In Job we read that the angels are created neither before nor after the world, but

contemporaneously<sup>68</sup>. As God could be said to have sent his dearest angel to the world, so too has Hobbes created an angel, Leviathan, to take care of the world he has created and which can take no other form than the state. And if it really is guards that one vaguely sees on the city's eastern square in the frontispiece, this only underlines that the (divine) mystery and the (political) ministry coincide in Leviathan in the form of a political soteriology that has all the characteristics of the police state<sup>69</sup>.

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


Illustration no. 1. Frontispiece, Thomas Hobbes' *Leviathan*, Abraham Bosse (1651)




Illustration no. 2. Frontispiece, *The King James Bible*, Church of England (1611)



Illustration no. 5. Gustave Doré, *Destruction de Léviathan* (1865)



Illustration no. 4. Jan van Eyck, Ghent's Alterpiece (1432)

## Notes

1. One of the few who has analysed *Leviathan's* iconography is Reinhardt Brandt in: *Das Titelblatt des Leviathan* (cf. Id. in: Kersting, Wolfgang (ed.) [1996]: *Leviathan – oder Stoff, Form und Gewalt eines bürgerlichen und kirchlichen Staates*, Akademie Verlag, Berlin, pp.29-53).
2. Michel Foucault [1975]: *Surveiller et punir. Naissance de la prison*, Gallimard, Paris, p.202f.
3. Bonaventure, *Commentaria in Quatuor Libros Sententiarum*, Liber I, pro oem., q. 4, resp., in: Opera Omnia S. Bonaventurae, Ad Claras Aquas, 1882, Cum Notitiis Originalibus, Vol 1, pp.14-15 (For an understanding of the things said, it must be noted, that fourfold is the manner of making a book. For one writes another's (words) by adding and/or changing nothing; and that one is called merely a *writer*. Another writes another's (words), by adding, but not from his own; and that one is called a *compiler*. Another writes both his own words and another', but the other's as the principle ones as the principles one, and his won as those annexed for evidence; and that one is called a *commentator*; not an author. Another writes both his own and another's, but his own as the principle ones, the other's as things annexed for confirmation; and such ought to be called an *author*.) Latin text with English translation by The Franciscan Archive at: <http://www.franciscan-archive.org/bonaventura/1-Sent.html>).
4. Cf. Baroncini, Daniele [2002]: "Citazione e memoria classica in Dante", in: *Leitmotiv*, no.2, p.153. ([www.ledonline.it/leitmotiv/](http://www.ledonline.it/leitmotiv/)).
5. Baroncini [2002]: p.154.
6. Bernhardt, Jean [1990]: "L'Oeuvre de Hobbes en optique et en théorie de la vision", in: Napoli, Andrea (ed.) *Hobbes oggi*, Milano, Franco Angeli, pp.245-268. The books Hobbes had in his library demonstrate his profound interest in optics; one section for instance bears the title *De perspectiva* (cf. Pacchi [1968]: p.35f.).
7. Cf. illustration no.1. This reproduction follows the laws concerning copyright (cf. [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Leviathan\\_gr.jpg](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Leviathan_gr.jpg)). For a treatment of Leviathan in Jewish art cf. Gutmann, Joseph [1968]: "Leviathan, Behemoth and Ziz; Jewish Messianic Symbols in Art," in: *Hebrew College Annual*, No.59, pp.219-250.
8. Cf. illustration no.2. where the four evangelists are depicted with their symbolic animals. This reproduction follows the laws concerning copyright (cf. <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:KJV-King-James-Version-Bible-first-edition-title-page-1611.jpg>).
9. *Biblia Sacra Iuxta Vulgatam Versionem* (Vulg.), Weber, Gryson et al, Deutsche Bibelgesellschaft 1969, Stuttgart 1994, ("You broke the heads of Leviathan in pieces, and gave him as meat to the people inhabiting the wilderness"). As the citation on *Leviathan's* frontispiece is from the Vulgate, it seems only natural to also base the examination of other biblical citations on this version. Sharp parenthesis [...] indicate throughout this article my insertions; all translations are mine unless otherwise

- indicated. In translating Biblical citations the English King James Bible has been consulted which, completed in 1611, was the one available in Hobbes' times (cf. <http://www.biblegateway.com>). Regarding the Bible and its reception- and history of translation, cf: Richard William Frederick Wootton, in: *Theologische Realenzyklopädie (TRE)*, De Greuter, Berlin, Boston 2009, pp.160-311. Regarding Greek and Latin translations, cf. Id.pp.160-196.
10. "In that day, the Lord with his sore and great and strong sword shall punish Leviathan the piercing serpent, even Leviathan that crooked serpent; and he shall slay the dragon that is in the sea."
  11. This ambiguity is also seen in Vulgata, *Liber Job* 40,25.
  12. *Encyclopædia Britannica*, vol.24,11, University of Cambridge, Cambridge 1911.
  13. In Jewish mythology Leviathan and Behemot almost appear as synonyms; interesting here, is that they are both related to (Jewish) conceptions of eschatology. A short introduction of this can be found in the 1906 *Jewish Encyclopedia* ('Leviathan and Behemoth'), in: <http://www.jewishencyclopedia.com/>.
  14. Cf. e.g. *Septuaginta id. est Vetus Testamentum graece iuxta LXX interpretes (LXX)*, Rahlfs (red.), Hanhart (revised edition), Deutsche Bibelgesellschaft 2006, Stuttgart, Ps. (LXX) 73,14.
  15. "the holy and fighting one".
  16. "And in all the land no woman were found so fair as the daughters of Job". Cf. the description of Job's first children in: *Job* 1,18-20. For another interpretation of Job, cf. Girard, René [1985]: *La route antique des hommes pervers*, Éditions Grasset & Fasquelle, Paris.
  17. Cf. Girard [1985]: pp.9-15; Negri, Antonio [2002]: *Job, la force de l'esclave*, Hachette Littératures, Paris, pp.97-101.
  18. For an analysis of violence in relation to the Bible, cf: Östman, Lars [2010]: *The Sacrificial Crisis – Law and Violence*, in: Contagion, MSU Press 2007, pp.97-119.
  19. The literature on Job is, as on every book of the Bible, needless to say enormous. A cornerstone is found in the chapter of Royce, Josiah [1898], "The Problem of Job", in: Id. *Studies of Good and Evil: A Series of Essays Upon Problems of Philosophy and of Life*, Hamden, Conn., 1964, pp.1-28. Some orientation, also concerning the problem of Theodicy, can be found in: Williams, Ronald J. [1985]: "Current Trends in The Study of The Book of Job", in: *Studies in the Book of Job*, Waterloo, Wilfrid Laurier University Press, pp.1-27. Regarding Job and the Biblical reception history, cf: Jürgen Ebach's "Hiob/ Hiobbuch" in: *Theologische Realenzyklopädie (TRE)*, De Greuter, Berlin, Boston 2009, pp.360-380 including an extensive list of literature.
  20. "And the Lord said to Satan, Have you considered my servant Job, there is no man as straightforward and righteous like him."
  21. For an analysis of Adam's disobedience, cf. Coccia, Emanuele [2008]: "Inobedientia'. Il peccato di Adamo e l'antropologia giudaico-cristiana", in: *Filosofia Politica*, XXII, no.1, April, pp.21-36.
  22. "The words of the Führer have force-of-law". The sentence was uttered by Adolph Eichmann on his trial in Jerusalem in 1961. Cf. Hannah Arendt's treatment of the aphorism in: Id. [1964]: *Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil*, revised ed., Penguin Classics, New York, 1964, pp.24; 128.
  23. Hobbes, Thomas [1651]: "Leviathan, or The Matter, Forme, & Power of a COMMON-WEALTH ECCLESIASTICAL AND CIVILL", in: *The English Works of Thomas Hobbes of Malmesbury*, Sir William Molesworth (ed.), Bohn, London 1839-1845, 11 volumes, vol.3, p.298 (italics mine).
  24. Cit. in Agamben [1995]: *Homo sacer. Il potere sovrano e la nuda vita*, Einaudi, Torino 2005, p.36.
  25. Agamben [1995]: p.41f.
  26. Hobbes [1651]: p.693.
  27. "May those who curse days, curse the day those who are ready to rouse Leviathan".
  28. "He [Leviathan] is the very beginning of God's ways. He who made him shall apply his sword."
  29. "He [Leviathan] is king over all the children of pride."
  30. Schmitt [1922]: p.43. Regarding this formulation and the theory of secularisation in general, cf. Jan Assmann's chapter: *Einführung: 'Politische Theologie' – Redefinition eines Begriffs*, in: Id. [2000]: *Herrschaft und Heil. Politische Theologie in Ägypten, Israel und Europa*, Fischer Taschenbuch Verlag, Frankfurt am Main, 2002, pp.15-31.
  31. Hobbes [1651]: p.158.
  32. "There is no power on earth that compares to yours."
  33. Hobbes [1651]: p.264.
  34. Bredekamp, Horst [2005]: *Thomas Hobbes' Der Leviathan. Das Urbild des modernen Staates und seine Gegenbilder 1651-2001*, Akademie Verlag, 3., korrigierte Auflage, Berlin 2005, p.56.
  35. Cf. illustration no.3. This reproduction follows the laws concerning copyright (cf. [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Destruction\\_of\\_Leviathan.png](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Destruction_of_Leviathan.png)).
  36. Hobbes [1651]: p.ix.
  37. Kantorowicz, Ernst H. [1961]: "Gods in uniform", in: Id. *Selected Studies*, J.J. Augustin Publisher, Locust Valley, New York 1965, pp.7-24.
  38. Agamben, Giorgio [2003]: *Stato di eccezione. Homo sacer, II, i*, Bollati Boringhieri, Torino 2004, p.55.
  39. Cicero: "Philippiche", in: Id. *Discours, Tome XX, texte et traduction* (Pierre Wuilleumier), 2.ed., Les Belles Lettres, Paris 1964, 5,12. Cf. Agamben [2003]: p.60.
  40. Cf. Agamben, Giorgio [2007]: *Il Regno e la Gloria. Per una genealogia teologica dell'economia e del governo. Homo sacer, II, ii*, Neri Pozza editore, Vicenza, p.197.
  41. Kantorowicz [1961]: p.18 (cf. illustration no. 4). This reproduction follows the laws concerning copyright. (cf. <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Eyck.hubert.lamb.750pix.jpg>).
  42. Hobbes [1651]: p.460.
  43. Hobbes [1651]: p.580. Concerning the concept of force-of-law, cf. Agamben [2003]: chap.2.
  44. On Hobbes's biblical knowledge cf: Martinich, A.P. "The Bible and Protestantism in Leviathan", in: Springborg, Patricia (ed.) [2007]: *The Cambridge Companion to Hobbes's 'Leviathan'*, Cambridge University Press, New York, pp.375-391.
  45. Peterson, Erik [1936]: "Christus als imperator", in: Id. *Ausgewählte Schriften I*, Echter Verlag, Würzburg 1994, p.86.
  46. Schmitt [1922]: p.14.
  47. Cf. Sennett, Richard [1990]: *The Conscience Of The Eye. The Design and Social Life of Cities*, W.W. Norton & Company, New York 1992, pp.46-49.
  48. *Cor I*, 12,12: "sicut enim corpus unum est et mem- | bra habet multa | omnia autem membra | corporis cum | sint multa unum corpus sunt | ita et Christus." ("For as the body is one, and hath many members, and all the members of that one body being many are one body, so also is Christ.").
  49. For an analysis of Leviathan as a geometrical principle in this regard cf. Brandt, in: Kersting (ed.) [1996]: pp.45-50; concerning the term 'shadow' cf. Stoichita, Victor I [1997]: *A Short History of the Shadow*, Reaktion Books, London 1999, esp. chap. 2 (pp.42-88).
  50. Sennett [1990]: pp.17-19.
  51. Calasso, Francesco [1954]: *Medioevo del diritto, I – Le fonti*, Dott. A. Giuffrè, Milano, p.164.
  52. Hobbes [1651]: p.460f.
  53. Hobbes [1651]: p.460f.
  54. Hobbes [1651]: p.256.
  55. Hobbes [1651]: p.437.
  56. Hobbes [1651]: p.298 ((italics mine)).
  57. Hobbes [1651]: p.114.
  58. Hobbes [1651]: p.113 (italics mine).

59. Hobbes [1651]: p.298.
60. Hobbes [1651]: p.116.
61. Andreas Pečar thus, like so many other scholars totally misinterprets Hobbes' idea of sovereignty when he defines it as a "complete transference [Übertragung]", in: Id. [2011]: *Macht der Schrift. Politischer Biblizismus in Schottland und England zwischen Reformation und Bürgerkrieg (1534-1642)*, Oldenbourg Verlag, München, p.113f.
62. Hobbes [1651]: p.116.
63. Agamben [2003]: p.15N.
64. Hobbes [1651]: p.298.
65. Hobbes [1651]: p.113.
66. Agamben [2003]: p.43.
67. The angelological aspect of the Christology is fully stated by Coccia: "[...] the angels's specific task is, by the way, like it is said, the salvation of men. In this sense, then, the christology is not only historically but especially logically a sort of angelology."( "Introduzione", in: Agamben, Giorgio & Coccia, Emanuele (ed.) [2010]: *Angeli. Ebraismo, Cristianesimo, Islam*, Neri Pozza, Torino, p.502; cf. also the extensive bibliography in n.212.
68. *Iob* 38,6-7.
69. Schmitt, Carl [1938]: *Der Leviathan in der Staatslehre des Thomas Hobbes. Sinn und Fehlschlag eines politischen Symbols*, Klett-Cotta, 3. Auflage, Stuttgart 2003, p.47.